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The Effects of Ownership Concentration and Institutional Distance on the Foreign 
Equity Ownership Strategy of Turkish MNEs 
 
ABSTRACT 
We investigate how ownership concentration and institutional distance both directly influence 
the equity-based ownership strategies of a sample of Turkish MNEs, and also how institutional 
differences moderate the link between ownership concentration and the equity-based ownership 
strategies of these firms. The findings suggest that neither ownership concentration nor 
institutional distance significantly affects the level of equity ownership. Although institutional 
distance variables have no direct effects on equity ownership, they tend to moderate the 
relationships between the ownership concentration and foreign equity ownership strategy of 
Turkish MNEs. In particular, we provide evidence that the regulative and normative 
dimensions of institutional distance affect the strength of the relationships between equity 
ownership strategy of MNEs and ownership concentration more so than the cognitive 
dimension of institutional distance. 
 
Keywords: Equity ownership, ownership concentration, institutional distance, corporate 
governance, emerging country, Turkey. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the last two decades, international equity ownership strategies of multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) have attracted a good deal of attention (Brouthers & Hennart, 2007; Pla-Barber, 
Sanchez-Peinado, & Madhok, 2010). Despite increasing interest in the strategies of emerging 
country (EC) MNEs (Brouthers, Brouthers, & Werner, 2000; Filatotchev, Strange, Piessel, & Lien, 
2007; Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008; Demirbag, Tatoglu, & Glaister, 2009), there is a paucity of 
empirical research that explores the effect of their corporate governance (CG) mechanisms by 
considering the institutional context of emerging markets (Bhaumik, Driffield, & Pal, 2010). Some 
studies examine the association between ownership concentration and international entry mode 
selection (e.g. Rhoades & Rechner, 2001; Musteen, Datta, & Herrmann, 2009; Meyer, Ding, Jing, 
& Zhang, 2014) or export behavior (e.g. Lu, Xu, & Liu, 2009; Hobdari, Gregoric, & Sinani, 2011). 
Only one study (Bhaumik et al., 2010), has examined the effect of ownership concentration on 
equity ownership of MNEs from EC MNEs.  
This study provides several contributions to the literature. Presenting an integrative model, we 
investigate how the conflicts between large and small shareholders from the viewpoint of the 
principal-principal perspective affect the equity ownership of EC MNEs in their internationalization 
process. This contributes to the literature on MNEs’ entry strategies in emerging countries, which 
has mainly concentrated on investigating the impact of ownership concentration from the principal-
agent perspective (Lu et al., 2009). Furthermore, we test the interaction effects of institutional 
factors and ownership concentration on foreign equity ownership strategies of EC MNEs, as this 
perspective has been largely neglected in previous research. We intend to fill this lacuna by 
analyzing both the direct and interaction effects of the ownership and institutional differences on 
equity ownership strategies of EC MNEs. 
Developed and emerging countries vary greatly with regard to the investment environment 
and institutional factors that may influence MNEs’ strategy choices of equity ownership in their 
subsidiaries (Makino, Isobe, & Chan, 2004). A general feature of emerging countries is that 
market-supporting institutions are less developed, and hence restrict MNEs’ strategic decisions 
(Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Yaprak & Demirbag, 2015). Emerging countries are assumed to have 
weaker institutional environments than developed countries. The uncertainty caused by a weak 
institutional environment complicates the legitimacy process for EC MNEs, while certain 
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institutions in developed countries are expected to facilitate isomorphism. This gives rise to an 
interesting research topic concerning the impact of institutional dissimilarities between home and 
host country on EC MNEs’ equity ownership strategies. Concentrating on this research gap, this 
study improves an institutional based view of international business strategy by examining 
ownership strategies of EC MNEs that invest in both developed and emerging country markets.  
Turkey is chosen as the site of this research because its characteristics make it a good 
representative example. In Turkey, structural diversity is weak, ownership is concentrated, and 
external monitoring is ineffective (Ararat, Aksu, & Tansel, 2015, p. 84). Furthermore, the structure 
of industrial organizations in Turkey resembles that of other emerging countries, such as, Brazil, 
Mexico, India and South Korea (Demirbag, Mirza, & Weir, 1995). MNEs from these countries need 
to cope with some challenges, such as, weak knowledge infrastructure, the liability of 
emergingness
1
, and capability gap between themselves and their rivals in developed countries 
(Wilkinson, Wood, & Demirbag, 2014). Turkey is a country in the French civil law tradition that is 
least protective of minority shareholders (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny et al., 
1997). Selekler-Goksen and Karatas (2008) note that external CG mechanisms are quite poor in 
Turkey. Families own more than two-thirds of all listed businesses and maintain majority control 
(Yurtoglu, 2003). Hence, it is not likely to rely on the market for corporate control as an external 
mechanism for CG (Selekler-Goksen & Karatas, 2008). In corporate environments, where there is 
no active market for corporate control, the emerging CG form is concentrated ownership (Gunduz 
& Tatoglu, 2003). Gursoy and Aydogan (2002) point out that ownership concentration is a 
significant determinant of CG mechanism in Turkey, and conclude that identifying controlling 
owners may significantly affect risk-taking behavior of the firms, where higher concentration leads 
to less risk-taking.  
Recently, Turkey has experienced significant economic success and institutional change, but 
as an emerging country, it is still characterized by its fluid and weak institutions (Demirbag et al., 
2014). Despite a fluid institutional structure, Turkey has generated a significant amount of both 
inward FDI and outward FDI (Vale Columbia Center, 2014). Therefore, the Turkish context 
                                                 
1
Emerging market MNEs face additional weaknesses due to their country of origin in addition to the liability of 
foreignness that they generally have to deal with while operating in foreign markets, (Nair, Demirbag and Mellahi, 
2015). These are often acknowledged as the “liability of emergingness” (Madhok & Keyhani 2012, p. 28). 
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provides a relevant research setting for examining EC MNEs’ equity ownership strategies since its 
proximity to, and level of integration with, the European Union (EU) creates both marketization and 
infusion of several social characteristics of the EU model (Agartan, 2010). Despite this, relatively 
few studies investigate the entry mode selection of Turkish MNEs’ foreign affiliates (Demirbag et 
al., 2009; Anil, Tatoglu, & Ozkasap, 2014), with most prior studies in the Turkish context focusing 
on entry mode strategy of Western MNEs in Turkey (Tatoglu, Glaister, & Erdal, 2003; Demirbag, 
Tatoglu, & Glaister, 2008, 2010). Importantly, no prior studies investigate the direct or interaction 
effects of ownership concentration and institutional distance on Turkish MNEs’ foreign equity 
ownership strategy. This study provides a crucial attempt to fill this lacuna by investigating the 
moderating impact of home country institutional factors on the link between ownership 
concentration and Turkish MNEs’ equity ownership strategies. 
 
2. Theoretical background and hypotheses 
To investigate the foreign equity ownership decisions of MNEs, we integrate two key theoretical 
streams – agency theory and institutional theory – but also take into account an emerging country 
setting. Agency theory posits that ownership structure is a substantial element in the strategic 
decision-making process in MNEs by influencing perception of, and attitude towards, risk in 
internationalization activities (Filatotchev & Wright, 2011). Ownership structure may be a key 
antecedent of managerial ability to implement internationalization strategies (Carpenter & 
Fredrickson, 2001; Filatotchev, Stephan, & Jindra, 2008). However, the impact of ownership 
structure on the internationalization strategy of EC MNEs is likely to be different from that of 
developed country MNEs (DC MNEs), viz., there may be significant differences between equity 
ownership choices of DC MNEs and EC MNEs in terms of different CG mechanisms (Filatotchev 
et al., 2007; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012). 
CG research conducted in western settings is mostly based on principal-agent conflict (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976), emanating from the separation of ownership and control (Berle & Means, 
1932). In contrast, in emerging countries, the principal-agent conflict turns into a principal-principal 
conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders (Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, 
Bruton, & Jiang, 2008). As noted, a key feature of many emerging countries is that market-
supporting institutions are too weak to regulate governance matters and thus confine the firm’s 
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strategic choices (Ramamurti, 2004). In this context, based on agency theory the board and 
ownership structures, responsibilities, actions, and risk aversion of EC MNEs are significantly 
dissimilar from those in developed countries. Consequently, the effect on entry strategy of the 
ownership structure is context-dependent, with EC MNEs following different internalization paths 
(Demirbag et al., 2009) and entry strategies (Filatotchev et al., 2007) from their counterparts in 
developed countries.  
A second theoretical perspective we adopt is institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
Scott, 1995), which presents a conceptual tool to examine the key antecedents of strategies of EC 
MNEs (Peng, 2003; Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson, & Peng, 2005). Institutions are usually defined 
as the “rules of the game in a society” (North, 1990, p. 3). These involve formal rules and informal 
constraints, which form the strategy of MNEs (Meyer & Peng, 2005). In this context, the main 
thesis of institutional theory is that the survival and success of an MNE depends on its conformity 
to the belief systems and rules prevalent in the market environment (Deephouse, 1996; Xu & 
Shenkar, 2002; Dacin, Oliver, & Roy, 2007). Drawing on existing conceptual work by Scott (1995) 
and Kostova (1996), we expand the notion of distance by including regulative, normative and 
cognitive pillars (Kostova & Roth, 2002; Xu & Shenkar, 2002).  
Institutional sources of inefficiency at home may force EC MNEs to enter developed markets 
where they may have access to new capabilities, which enable them to close knowledge and 
capability gaps between themselves and their developed country rivals. Therefore, institutional 
voids provide significant motives for EC MNEs to create a portfolio of international operations in 
emerging and developed markets (Khanna & Palepu, 2006). Often, these are in the form of mergers 
and acquisitions through which EC MNEs aim to manage the liability of emergingness (Hennart, 
2012), and increase reverse knowledge flow from acquired subsidiaries (Nair, Demirbag, & 
Mellahi, 2015). In this study, we improve the extant research on EC MNEs’ internationalization by 
examining the impact of the parent level ownership concentration based on an institutional theory 
perspective. 
 
2.1. The impact of ownership concentration on EC MNE ownership strategies  
Internal CG characteristics, such as share ownership structure, influence the strategies of EC 
MNEs, and consequently their internationalization efforts (Filatotchev et al., 2007; Hodbari, 
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Gregoric, & Sinani, 2011), because different types and levels of owners have various degrees of risk 
aversion and decision-making views (Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000; Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & 
Grossman, 2002; Filatotchev, Lien, & Piesse, 2005). The interests of shareholders vary with respect 
to their extent of equity stake in the parent company (Musteen, Datta, & Herrmann, 2009). The 
more concentrated the ownership of the EC MNE, the lower the likelihood of its equity ownership 
in foreign subsidiaries (Laamanen, Simula, & Torstila, 2012). 
Agency theory views minority shareholders, who can distribute their overall risk in 
diversified portfolios, as risk neutral (Rhoades & Rechner, 2001; Wright, Kroll, Lado, & Van Ness, 
2002). Minority shareholders’ interests of maximizing return on investment lead to higher risk and 
higher return equity ownership, for instance, a wholly owned subsidiary (WOS) instead of a joint 
venture (JV). According to agency theory, based on principal-agent conflict, ownership 
concentration and the presence of dominant shareholders play a central role in protecting minority 
shareholders’ interests against management (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Filatotchev & Wright, 
2011). However, in an emerging country, this relationship can be different, as the principal-agent 
conflict turns into a principal-principal conflict between controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders (Peng et al., 2008; Young et al., 2008). As external CG mechanisms are poor in many 
emerging countries, it is not possible to hinge on the market for corporate control as an external CG 
mechanism (Selekler-Goksen & Karatas, 2008). In the absence of active market for corporate 
control, concentrated ownership is an optimal response to CG (Heugens, Essen, & van Oosterhout, 
2009). Filatotchev and Wright (2011) argue that if there is not a strong institutional environment 
that provides protection to minority shareholders, large shareholders may have a greater influence 
on EC MNEs’ strategy.  
While concentrated ownership confers specific competitive advantage, such as flexibility, 
long-term orientation, low agency costs, and swift decision-making, it has some disadvantages, such 
as lack of international experience and limitations of gaining access to the relevant resources and 
capabilities required for the internationalization process (Fernandez & Nieto, 2006). Large 
shareholders perceive the high risk and cost of outward FDI and prefer not to enter the foreign 
market. Decisions regarding international growth present a high degree of uncertainty, because EC 
MNEs enter geographically or institutionally distant foreign markets. The large shareholders tend to 
avoid high-risk international modes of entry characterized by high equity ownership. 
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Such risk aversion intensifies as the equity ownership of large shareholders increases (Liu, Li, 
& Xue, 2011; Garcia-Marco & Robles-Fernandez, 2008). When the extent of ownership 
concentration is relatively low, large shareholders may be encouraged to increase shareholder value 
by engaging in value-adding strategic initiatives (Lu et al., 2009). In contrast, when the level of 
ownership concentration is relatively high, they can use their high equity ownership to follow their 
own interests to the detriment of minority shareholders because of goal incongruence (Lu et al., 
2009; Connelly, Hoskisson, Tihanyi, & Certo, 2010). Differences between the interests of minority 
shareholders and large shareholders will be more pronounced when large shareholders’ equity stake 
constitutes a significant proportion of their personal wealth. Internationalization involves 
considerable risk-taking, especially for EC MNEs with limited knowledge of foreign markets. 
Generally, large shareholders will be unwilling to lose control of the company or to design growth 
strategies (Fernandez & Nieto, 2006). International growth entails the execution of complex 
strategies, organizational structures, and formal control mechanisms, while decentralization is seen 
as a loss of control. The desire of large shareholders to maintain independence and control thus 
hinders internationalization.  
Large shareholders who cannot diversify their portfolios sufficiently may prefer less risk to 
more risk (Wright, Ferris, Sarin, & Awasthi, 1996, 1996). They may pursue to maximize turnover 
from a few foreign markets rather than relentlessly follow internationalization on a broad scope 
(Zahra, 2003; Kontinen & Ojala, 2010). They may be more reluctant to undertake operations in 
markets where the firm lacks familiarity (Claver, Rienda, & Quer, 2008). Therefore, with highly 
concentrated ownership, especially with a founding family or family members, EC MNEs are likely 
to adopt low control and low risk equity ownership in order to diversify portfolio risk. 
 
H1. The greater the ownership concentration the lower the level of equity ownership of Turkish 
MNE subsidiaries. 
 
2.2. The impact of institutional distance on EC MNE ownership strategies  
Formal and informal rules of the game determined by host country regulatory, normative and 
cognitive dimensions of institutions (North, 1990) significantly shape the MNEs’ equity ownership 
strategies in the host country (Scott, 1995; Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik, & Peng, 2009; Guler & 
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Guillen, 2010). The regulative dimension reflects prevailing laws and rules in a host country that 
endorses particular forms of behaviors and restricts others. The cognitive pillar on the other hand 
refers to “cognitive categories that are widely shared by the people in a particular society” 
(Kostova, 1999, p. 314). The normative dimension consists of values, norms, and beliefs that 
describe expected behavior in a society and may have direct relevance with the strategy of the MNE 
(Xu & Shenkar, 2002). 
Relying on Scott (1995), Kostova (1996) developed the construct of institutional distance, 
denoting the degree of the difference or similarity between the regulatory, cognitive, and normative 
institutional environments of the home and host countries of an MNE. The greater the institutional 
distance, the harder it becomes for the MNE to understand the host environment and its legitimacy 
requirements (Kostova, 1996; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). If there are great institutional distinctions 
between home and host countries, the MNE will have to make a choice between internal or external 
legitimacy oriented strategy alternatives (Xu, Pan, & Beamish, 2004). Many studies claim that 
gaining external legitimacy is more vital than internal legitimacy for EC MNEs, especially in 
countries with very dissimilar institutional settings (Xu & Shenkar, 2002). The larger the 
institutional distance the harder it becomes to establish external legitimacy in host countries 
(Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). Lack of external legitimacy causes lower levels of performance for the 
overall EC MNE (Chao & Kumar, 2010). In this context, EC MNEs’ strategic decisions are 
motivated initially by their search for external legitimacy and they will prefer a low level of equity 
shareholding in their subsidiaries (Gaur & Lu, 2007). A huge institutional distance between the 
home and host countries entails the MNE to assess, learn and adapt more broadly to local 
institutional norms and agents (Ferreira, Li, & Jang, 2007). EC MNEs, more than DC MNEs, are 
likely to display more risk aversion behavior, adopting a low proportion of equity ownership when 
institutional dissimilarities between home and host countries are huge. They shy away from 
investing in institutionally distant host country markets because their corporate activities in those 
markets necessitate compliance with institutional contexts that contradict with those of the home 
country (Xu & Shenkar, 2002). 
In order to cope with institutional distance and reduce risk, EC MNEs select a more flexible 
entry mode, such as a JV or lower equity ownership mode. The local partner reduces the EC MNE’s 
liability of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995) and increases the gaining of external institutional legitimacy 
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in the host country (Baum & Oliver, 1991). In summary, large institutional distance in terms of 
regulative, normative and cognitive pillars leads EC MNEs to choose a lower equity stake in their 
foreign subsidiaries.  
 
H2a. The greater the regulative distance between home and host countries the lower the level of 
equity ownership of Turkish MNE subsidiaries. 
H2b. The greater the normative distance between home and host countries the lower the level of 
equity ownership of Turkish MNE subsidiaries. 
H2c. The greater the cognitive distance between home and host countries the lower the level of 
equity ownership of Turkish MNE subsidiaries. 
 
2.3. Moderating effect of institutional distance  
The regulative, normative and cognitive pillars of institutional distance may directly affect EC 
MNEs’ internationalization strategies, and also indirectly through other determinants of entry 
strategies such as CG mechanisms (Young et al., 2008). Institutional distance as a moderator 
variable influences the direction and strength of the relationship between ownership concentration 
of EC MNEs and equity ownership strategies in their subsidiaries (Lu et al., 2009).  
The moderating effect of institutional distance may differ for each of the three pillars (Eden & 
Miller, 2004; Arslan, 2012). When there is a huge regulative distance, DC MNEs may tend to prefer 
a higher level of equity stake to provide more efficient monitoring, coordination and control of 
foreign subsidiaries (Gaur & Lu, 2007, p. 89). As institutional distance increases, it becomes much 
tougher to find reliable indigenous partners. Moreover, the regulative pillar is more formal and 
more clearly stated than the cognitive and normative pillars (Scott, 1995). The regulative 
institutions are defined and coded in laws, rules and regulations, so DC MNEs can observe, 
understand and interpret the host country regulative environment more easily than the country’s 
normative and cognitive settings (Eden & Miller, 2004), which reduces the unfamiliarity hazard for 
DC MNEs. Even where the regulative distance is large, DC MNEs can manage this easily through a 
high level of equity stake (Gaur & Lu, 2007). This means DC MNEs do not have to count on 
indigenous partners for overcoming liability of foreignness in international markets characterized 
by high levels of regulative distance.  
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However, this situation is somewhat different for EC MNEs. When the institutional distance 
is high, decisions regarding international growth present a high degree of uncertainty. The large 
shareholders tend to avoid high-risk international modes of entry characterized by high equity 
ownership when the institutional distance between home and host countries is huge. Therefore, they 
prefer low equity ownership in their subsidiaries to mitigate risk. On the other hand, in comparison 
with DC MNEs, a larger regulative distance presents difficulties for EC MNEs to understand host 
country regulative institutions and to establish legitimacy in this foreign environment. EC MNEs 
cannot observe, understand and interpret the host country regulative environment easily. Therefore, 
in terms of gaining legitimacy, it is preferable for the EC MNEs to involve indigenous partners that 
are knowledgeable about the host country regulative environment, thereby being more likely to 
prefer an equity stake with a lower degree of control (Xu et al., 2004). Although the selection of a 
partner in an unfamiliar environment is a challenge because of opportunistic behavior of partners 
and relational hazards in unfamiliar settings, in practice, the indigenous partner may assist the EC 
MNE to increase legitimacy and reduce the internationalization risks emanating mostly from 
liability of foreignness when the regulative distance is high.  
 
H3a. The regulative institutional distance moderates the link between ownership concentration and 
the level of equity ownership of Turkish MNEs' subsidiaries: When the regulative distance is high, 
the link between ownership concentration and the level of equity ownership of Turkish MNEs in 
their subsidiaries is negative. 
 
There are some distinctions between the regulative, normative and cognitive dimensions of 
institutional distance for equity shareholding. Compared to normative and cognitive distances, the 
regulative distance is more appropriate for comparing the success of WOS and high equity 
ownership modes to lower equity ownership modes (Xu et al., 2004). Like regulative distance, both 
normative and cognitive distances also cause great unfamiliarity hazard for EC MNEs. The 
normative features of institutions are typically informal and deep-rooted in the social environment 
(Scott, 1995). Large normative distance makes it challenging for an EC MNE to acquire 
information about these features, and indigenous partners are supportive in dealing with 
unfamiliarity arising from high normative and cognitive distances (Cui & Jiang, 2012). Large 
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normative and cognitive distances increase the effects of ownership concentration on equity stake of 
EC MNEs in their subsidiaries towards low equity ownership modes. That is, in the presence of 
high normative and cognitive distances between home and host countries, EC MNEs characterized 
by a high degree of ownership concentration will be more willing to choose a lower equity stake in 
their foreign subsidiaries.  
 
H3b. The normative institutional distance moderates the link between ownership concentration 
and the level of equity ownership of Turkish MNEs' subsidiaries: When the normative distance is 
high, the link between ownership concentration and the level of equity ownership of Turkish 
MNEs in their subsidiaries is negative. 
 
H3c. The cognitive institutional distance moderates the link between ownership concentration and 
the level of equity ownership of Turkish MNEs' subsidiaries: When the cognitive distance is high, 
the link between ownership concentration and the level of equity ownership of Turkish MNEs in 
their subsidiaries is negative. 
 
Fig. 1 shows the direct impacts of ownership concentration and institutional distance on 
Turkish MNEs’ equity ownership strategies in their foreign subsidiaries along with the moderating 
effects of each of the dimensions of institutional distance.  A set of control variables are also 
considered.  
------------------------------- 
Fig. 1 
------------------------------- 
 
3. Research methodology 
3.1. Sample 
The sample for this study was picked from the overall population of 364 firms listed on the 
Istanbul Stock Exchange (BIST) (http://www.kap.gov.tr) based the following selection criteria: (1) 
parent firms with at least one FDI at the minority JV level; (2) parent firms with at least 10% 
ownership of subsidiaries; (3) parent firms where necessary data relating to institutional distances 
and the other variables at parent, subsidiary and host country levels could not be obtained were 
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excluded from the sample; (4) parent companies operating in the finance and banking sectors were 
excluded because, in general, they do not use FDI strategies. These selection criteria resulted in a 
database of 355 foreign subsidiaries of 68 listed Turkish MNEs as parent companies as of 2014. 
The sample consists of WOSs (47.6%) and JVs (52.4%) with various levels of ownership. 
The sample subsidiaries operate in 52 different host countries, almost half of which are developed 
countries, with the other half emerging countries. The sectoral breakdown of the subsidiaries is as 
follows; manufacturing industries including agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining, and others 
(29.9%); wholesale and retail trade (33.0%); services including construction, communication, gas 
and sanitary services, electric,  insurance, real estate, transportation, and other services (37.2%). 
 
3.2. Operationalization of variables 
Dependent variable. The equity ownership level (EQOWN) of Turkish MNEs in their subsidiaries 
constitutes the dependent variable, measured by the percentage of equity shareholding of the 
Turkish MNE in its subsidiary operating in the host country on a range from 10% to 100% 
(Demirbag et al., 2009). This variable was acquired from the Public Disclosure Platform 
(http://www.kap.gov.tr) and the annual reports of the companies. 
 
Predictor variable. The ownership concentration of Turkish MNEs was measured from firm annual 
reports and audited financial tables (Demirag & Serter, 2003; Perrini, Rossi, & Rovetta, 2008; 
Sahin, Basfirinci, & Ozsalih, 2011; Caprio, Croci, & Giudice, 2011). The largest shareholder 
(CONCEN) was calculated by the percentage of the greatest number of shares directly owned by 
the controlling shareholders (Mitton, 2002; Chrinko, Van Ees, Garretsen, & Sterken, 2004).  
 
Control variables. We included control variables at the parent (international diversification and 
unrelated product diversification), host country (country risk, corruption distance and emerging 
country) and subsidiary (subsidiary size and industry) levels.  
International diversification (INTDIVER) denotes the degree to which Turkish MNEs are 
active in different foreign geographic regions or markets (Hitt & Ireland, 1994; Hitt, Hoskisson, & 
Kim, 1997). International diversification is likely to raise MNEs’ risks due to increased 
organizational complexities and uncertainties related to operating in new markets (Tihanyi, Griffith, 
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& Craig, 2005). Therefore, we expect Turkish MNEs to choose lower equity ownership in their 
subsidiaries in order to avoid the potential risks stemming from institutional and cultural differences 
between home and host country operations.  Consistent with relevant literature (Delios & Beamish, 
1999; Lu & Beamish, 2004; David, O’Brien, Yoshikawa, & Delios, 2010), this variable was 
computed as: 
 
INTDIVER=[
Subidiary (i)
Subsidiary(Max)
+  
Country (i)
Contry (Max)
] /2 
 
Where subsidiary (i) is the Turkish MNE’s total number of foreign subsidiaries; subsidiary 
(max) is maximum number of foreign subsidiaries in the sample; country (i) is the number of host 
countries in which the MNE invests; and country (max) is the maximum number of FDI host 
countries in the sample. Data were acquire from the Public Disclosure Platform in Turkey and 
firms’ annual reports. 
Unrelated product diversification (UNREDIV) is the degree to which firms expand their 
operations by developing new products (Hitt et al., 1997). In line with prior research (Cuervo-
Cazurra, Maloney, & Manrakhan, 2007; Demirbag et al., 2009), we envisage that Turkish MNEs 
that diversify will be more willing to prefer lower equity ownership in their subsidiaries. UNREDIV 
was operationalized by an entropy measure of diversification proposed by Palepu (1985), which has 
been adopted in prior studies (Hitt et al., 1997; Delios & Beamish, 1999; Sanders, 2001; Carpenter 
& Fredrickson, 2001; Hillman, Shropshire, & Cannella, 2007; Bouquet, Morrison, & Birkinshaw, 
2009; David et al., 2010). Data for product diversification were obtained again from the Public 
Disclosure Platform, firms’ financial reports, and SIC codes from the US Department of Labor. 
UNREDIV was measured as follows: 
 
𝐷𝑈 = ∑ 𝑃𝐽ln (1/
𝑀
𝑗=1
𝑃𝐽) 
 
Where DU is unrelated diversification, and 𝑃𝐽 is the share of the jth group sales in the total 
sales of the firm. 
The subsidiary size (SUBSIZE) was measured by the contributed capital of the subsidiary. 
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The industry sectors of the subsidiaries (SECTOR) were classified as mining, agriculture, 
forestry and fishing, manufacturing, electric, transportation, construction, insurance, wholesale and 
retail trade, communication, real estate, gas and sanitary services. To create industry dummies, 
these sectors were then categorized into three industry groups of manufacturing, service, and 
wholesale and retail trade. 
A dummy variable (EMRGCON) was created, assigned 0 where the host country is an 
emerging country, or 1 otherwise, using the International Monetary Fund’s country classification 
based on the host country’s level of economic development. 
Country risk (COUNTRISK) refers to the uncertainty derived from the host country’s social, 
legal, economic and political contexts (Quer, Claver, & Rienda, 2007). Host country risk scores 
were obtained from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG, 2012) published by the Political 
Risk Services (PRS) Group (http://www.prsgroup.com). The country risk scores are based on a 
composite risk rating which include political (50%), financial (25%) and economic (25%) risk 
ratings. The composite risk index allows evaluation of country risk between 0 and 100. Higher 
overall risk scores indicate a lower country risk, while lower scores denote a higher country risk. 
The corruption distance (CORDIST) was computed via Kogut and Singh’s (1988) procedure 
based on the scores obtained from the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) published by 
Transparency International (TI, 2012). Corruption is defined as “use or abuse of public power for 
private benefits” (Judge, McNatt, & Xu, 2011, p. 93) and “generally includes practices such as 
bribery, fraud, extortion and favoritism” (Luo, 2004, p. 122). However, the most noticeable aspect 
of the concept can be considered as unmerited contacts and rights provided to firms in exchange for 
bribes (Rodriguez & Rodriguez, 2005). Consistent with previous research (e.g., Demirbag, Glaister, 
& Tatoglu, 2007), we expect that as the corruption distance increases, Turkish MNEs will prefer a 
lower equity stake in their subsidiaries. 
 
Moderator variables. Data for regulative and normative institutional dimensions were collected 
from data in Global Competitiveness Report (World Economic Forum, 2012). Several studies 
(Kaynak, Demirbag, & Tatoglu, 2007; Chao & Kumar, 2010) have relied on information provided 
by these reports to measure regulative and normative dimensions. Following Ilhan-Nas (2012), data 
 15 
for measuring cognitive distance (COGDIST) were obtained from the Knowledge Economy Index of 
the World Bank (KEI, 2012).  
Regulative distance (REGDIST) was evaluated by the average of the following six items: 
efficiency of legal framework, judicial independence, property rights, burden of government 
regulation, intellectual property rights protection, and transparency of government policy-making.  
Normative distance (NRMDIST) was measured through five items: efficacy of corporate 
boards, strength of auditing and reporting standards, ethical behavior of firms, quality of 
management schools, and local availability of specialized research and training services. 
Cognitive distance (COGDIST) was evaluated by the average of the normalized performance 
scores of a country or region based on three aspects associated with the knowledge economy: 
education and human resources (adult literacy rate, secondary enrollment and tertiary enrollment); 
information and communication technology (telephone, computer and internet penetrations); and 
innovation (scientific and technical journal articles, patent applications granted by the US patent 
and trademark office, and total royalty payments and receipts).  
Following Kogut and Singh’s (1988) approach, these distances were separately calculated as: 
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Where Ii, host (Ii, origin) is the ith dimension of the index for the host country (country of 
origin- Turkey) and Vi is the variance of ith dimension. Standardized values for each sub-index 
were used since scales are not the same across dimensions. 
 
3.3. Data analysis 
The study’s hypotheses were tested by means of multiple linear regression analyses. 
Following Aiken and West (1991), the interactive terms were created by multiplying together the 
centered values of CONCEN and institutional distance variables. Consistent with other studies 
(Thwaites & Dagnan, 2004; Harber, 2005; Hoffman, Bynum, Piccolo, & Sutton, 2011), a moderator 
analysis technique was selected as the model in this study. A moderator (M) is a qualitative or 
quantitative variable that influences the direction and strength of the relationship between a 
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dependent (Y) and an independent (X) variable (Baron & Kenny, 1986). Moderation was tested 
through the following regression equation (Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007). 
Y= b0 + b1X + b2M + b3 XM 
In line with Baron and Kenny (1986), our research framework (Fig. 1), consists of three 
causal effects on EC MNE ownership strategies: (1) “ownership concentration” as an estimator, (2) 
“institutional distance” as both another estimator and a moderator variable, and (3) “the interaction” 
produced by these two variables. There is no direct conceptual relationship between the estimator 
and moderator variables to test the moderator hypothesis. The relationship is based on the 
significance of the effect of interaction. A significant effect of interaction on ownership strategies 
means that the effects of ownership concentration on foreign equity ownership strategies are shaped 
to some extent by the institutional distance (Zeitner, 1998). However, the results of the moderator 
analysis do not clearly demonstrate how high or low levels of the moderator variable (institutional 
distance) have an impact on high or low levels of the independent variable (ownership 
concentration). To overcome this limitation, we use the graphs of regression coefficients for 
significant moderator models as recommended by Aiken and West (1991) and Cohen, Patricia, 
West, and Aiken (2003). 
 
4. Results 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix. None of the correlations 
between explanatory variables have correlation coefficients above 0.70, and the variance inflation 
factors (VIF) for our variables are much lower than the acceptable threshold value of 10 (Freund, 
Wilson, & Sa, 2006). Hence, the issue of multicollinearity in models does not pose a risk in this 
study (Gujarati, 1995; Kennedy, 1999). However, there are strong correlations between control 
variables, viz., country risk, corruption distance, emerging country and institutional distances, 
which can lead to multicollinearity problems. Therefore, we do not use these control variables in the 
models containing institutional distance variables. Similarly, correlation coefficients between 
institutional distance variables are out of tolerance limits. Consequently, these variables are tested 
in separate models. The analyses are also checked for heteroscedasticity by the Breusch-
Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test and no serious problem is detected.  
------------------------------- 
Table 1 
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4.1. The main effects of ownership concentration on equity ownership strategies of Turkish MNEs 
Table 2 presents regression models predicting the direct and interaction effects of the ownership 
concentration and institutional distance on the Turkish MNEs’ equity ownership choice. There are 
six models for main effects (Model 1 through Model 6) and three models for examining interactions 
(Model 7 through Model 9). Model 3 shows the full model containing whole set of independent and 
control variables. This arrangement is to accommodate the variables that we used to measure 
ownership structure and institutional distance for H1, H2a, H2b, H2c (Model 1 through Model 6) 
and H3a, H3b and H3c (Model 7 through Model 9).  
Overall, no support is found for H1, as the coefficient of CONCEN (the largest shareholder) is 
negative, but insignificant in Models 1 to 9.  
Considering the control variables, Table 2 indicates that the most influential variables are 
found to be parent-level control variables of INTDIVER and UNREDIV, whose coefficients are 
negative and significant (p-value < 0.01). Neither subsidiary-level nor country-level control 
variables are significant. 
------------------------------- 
Table 2 
------------------------------- 
We predicted that the greater the regulative (H2a), normative (H2b) and cognitive (H2c) 
distances, the more likely that Turkish MNEs will choose lower equity positions in their 
subsidiaries. However, the coefficients of the regulative and normative distances are negative 
though the coefficient of cognitive distance is positive but not significant in all three models 
(Models 4 to 6), providing no support for H2a to H2c. It appears that differences in all three 
dimensions of institutional distance between the home and host countries do not have a direct 
impact on the foreign equity ownership strategies of Turkish MNEs. 
 
4.2. Moderating effects of institutional distance 
To determine the moderating impact of institutional distance on the link between ownership 
concentration and equity ownership strategies of Turkish MNEs, we executed a series of moderated 
regression analyses with equity ownership as the dependent variable (Models 7 to 9 of Table 2). A 
significant interaction term means that the effects of the ownership concentration on the equity 
ownership of Turkish MNEs in their subsidiaries is determined to some extent by the institutional 
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distance between home and host countries (Zeitner, 1998). In such cases, institutional distance 
strengthens the link between the ownership concentration and equity ownership strategies. 
However, the interaction term does not identify the conditions that dictate how the estimator is 
explicitly related to the outcome, which constitutes the subject of this study. Hence, to test the effect 
of ownership concentration on foreign equity ownership strategies of Turkish MNEs with high 
versus low institutional distance levels, simple slope tests are performed whereby we check whether 
the interaction is significant when the institutional distance is high vs. low. Interaction effects are 
then plotted at low and high levels of each of the institutional distance dimensions, as shown in Figs 
2a to 2c, and are interpreted in line with Aiken and West (1991). 
Model 7 of Table 2 indicates that the interactions between REGDIST (regulative distance) 
and ownership concentration at CONCEN level is significantly associated with the equity 
ownership of Turkish MNEs in their subsidiaries (p-value < 0.01). To enhance our understanding of 
the effects of REGDIST, a simple slope analysis is conducted by plotting interaction results at high 
and low levels of REGDIST for CONCEN, as shown in Fig. 2a. 
Fig. 2a shows that the ownership concentration (CONCEN) negatively influences equity 
ownership when REGDIST is high (β = -0.259; p-value < 0.01). That is, when the REGDIST 
between Turkey and the host country is high, the larger CONCEN, the lower the extent of Turkish 
MNEs’ equity shareholding in their subsidiaries. This finding supports H3a stating that the 
association between ownership concentration and the Turkish MNEs’ equity ownership level in 
their subsidiaries is negative when the REGDIST is high.  
---------------------------------------- 
Figs 2a, 2b, 2c 
---------------------------------------- 
Model 8 of Table 2 indicates that the interaction effects between NRMDIST (normative 
distance) and ownership concentration (CONCEN) is significantly associated with equity ownership 
of Turkish MNEs in their subsidiaries (p-value < 0.01). Therefore, a simple slope analysis is 
conducted by plotting interaction results at high and low levels of NRMDIST for CONCEN level, 
as shown in Fig. 2b.  
Fig. 2b shows the plot of the interaction between CONCEN and NRMDIST on the equity 
shareholding levels of Turkish MNEs in their subsidiaries. This plot indicates a negative 
relationship between CONCEN and equity ownership levels when NRMDIST is high (β = -0.243; 
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p-value < 0.05). This finding supports H3b stating that the link between ownership concentration 
and the equity ownership of Turkish MNEs in their subsidiaries is negative when the normative 
distance is high.  
The moderating effect of COGDIST (cognitive distance) on the link between ownership 
concentration and the equity ownership level of Turkish MNEs in their subsidiaries is displayed in 
Model 9 of Table 2. We support the moderating impact of COGDIST on the link between 
CONCEN (Fig. 2c) and equity ownership of Turkish MNEs, as the interaction term between 
CONCEN and COGDIST is significant (p-value < 0.05). The plot of the significant interaction 
between CONCEN and COGDIST in Fig. 2c shows a negative relationship for high level of 
COGDIST (β = -0.171; p-value < 0.05). This finding is consistent with our expectation in H2c 
stating that the link between ownership concentration and the equity ownership level of Turkish 
MNEs is negative when the COGDIST is high. We find support for H3c. 
 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
Drawing upon agency theory and institutional theory from the viewpoint of emerging 
countries, we estimate how institutional differences and ownership concentration both directly 
affect the equity-based ownership strategies of Turkish MNEs and also how institutional differences 
moderate the link between ownership concentration and ownership strategies. We report a number 
of important outcomes that offer some useful implications for scholars and managers investigating 
CG mechanisms from an international perspective. The impact of ownership concentration on the 
foreign equity ownership strategy in an emerging country context differs significantly from that in a 
developed country context. This implies that the emerging country context is a critical determinant 
of CG effects.  
The findings suggest that the ownership concentration has no effect on the equity ownership 
of EC MNEs in their foreign subsidiaries. Consistent with relevant literature (Demirag & Serter, 
2003; Kula, 2005), we find that Turkish MNEs exhibit a highly concentrated ownership structure 
like many firms from emerging countries. The largest shareholders of Turkish MNEs (CONCEN) 
have nearly half of ownership. However, contrary to previous research, there is no main effect of 
the largest shareholders on equity ownership strategies of Turkish MNEs. In this context, we cannot 
explain the risk aversion of CONCEN in an emerging country using only an agency perspective. 
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However, when we add the moderating effects of three institutional distances to the analysis, 
Turkish MNEs having high CONCEN are less likely to prefer risk-taking at high regulative 
(REGDIST), normative (NRMDIST) and cognitive institutional distance (COGDIST). That is, 
when REGDIST, NRMDIST or COGDIST of Turkey and the host country is high (viz., the 
regulative, normative or cognitive environment of the host country is not similar to Turkey), 
Turkish MNEs with high level of CONCEN choose a lower level of equity stake in their 
subsidiaries.  
Overall, the findings reveal that the main determinant of MNEs’ equity shareholding in their 
subsidiaries is not institutional distance per se. Institutional distance has a moderating effect rather 
than a direct effect on the link between the CG mechanism and entry strategies. This study provides 
strong evidence that regulative, normative and cognitive distances affect the strength of the 
interaction between ownership concentration and equity ownership of MNEs. These findings are at 
odds with those of previous studies focusing on DC MNEs (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Gaur & Lu, 
2007; Trevino, Thomas, & Cullen, 2008). In comparison with DC MNEs, the EC MNEs with large 
shareholders prefer a low equity ownership in their subsidiaries because of risk avoidance. It is 
preferable for an EC MNE to involve an indigenous partner that is knowledgeable about the host 
country regulative environment, thereby being more likely to select an equity ownership mode with 
a lesser control (Xu et al., 2004). This study suggests that the EC MNEs’ equity ownership 
strategies are more influenced by the moderating impacts of regulative and normative distances than 
by cognitive distance. The host country regulative environment perhaps is the easiest for MNEs to 
monitor, understand and accurately interpret since regulative institutions are codified and 
formalized in rules and procedures (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999), whereas the cognitive pillar is often 
tacit and difficult to comprehend (Boyacigiller, Goodman, & Phillips, 2004).  
 
5.1. Contributions, limitations and future research 
We make several contributions. First, most prior studies in CG literature have neglected the 
links between CG mechanisms and foreign entry strategy. This study extends the relevant literature 
by investigating equity ownership from the viewpoint of CG considered in terms of ownership 
concentration. Second, we systematically investigate foreign market equity ownership decisions of 
EC MNEs. Consequently, this study makes an important attempt in enhancing our understanding of 
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how CG mechanisms of EC MNEs differ from DC MNEs with regard to functionality and 
operationalization. Third, this may be considered the first study to analyze both the direct and the 
moderating impacts of institutional distance on ownership concentration and EC MNEs’ equity 
ownership of subsidiaries. The moderator variable of institutional distance strengthens the link 
between ownership concentration and equity ownership of EC MNE subsidiaries. That is, when the 
institutional distance is high, the link between ownership concentration and the equity ownership 
level of Turkish MNEs in their subsidiaries becomes negative. 
The findings have implications for practice, especially for emerging country foreign investors 
and managers. The effects of CG mechanisms on equity ownership of EC MNEs differ from those 
of DC MNEs, with significant differences between FDI strategies of DC MNEs and those of EC 
MNEs from the viewpoint of ownership concentration. Managers of MNEs should take these cross-
country CG mechanism differences into consideration if they want to be successful in the risk 
management of their overseas subsidiaries. 
This study is subject to some limitations that should be acknowledged when evaluating the 
findings. First, our sample is confined to Turkish MNEs. Further studies of other EC MNEs would 
help to better understand how CG mechanisms and institutional distance matters. Another limitation 
is that we focus on ownership concentration as a CG mechanism. However, board structure and top 
management team characteristics including commitment to risk tolerance and personal attributes are 
also important factors determining the international strategy of the firm, which should be addressed 
in future research.  
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Fig. 2a. The interaction between CONCEN and REGDIST 
 
 
 
Fig. 2b. The interaction between CONCEN and NRMDIST 
 
 
 
Fig. 2c. The interaction between CONCEN and COGDIST 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
Notes:  
EQOWN: Equity ownership, CONCEN: The largest shareholder, INTDIVER: International diversification, UNREDIV: Unrelated product diversification, SUBSIZE: The size of the subsidiary, 
SECTOR (MAN): Manufacturing sector operated, SECTOR (TER): Tertiary sector operated, COUNTRISK: Country risk, CORDIST: Corruption distance, EMRGCON: Emerging country, REGDIST: 
Regulative distance, NRMDIST: Normative distance, COGDIST: Cognitive distance. 
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.  
a SUBSIZE/million Turkish lira 
N = 355 
 
 
 
 
  
Variables Mean SD Min. Max. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. EQOWN 78.54 26.88 1.00 100 1             
2. CONCEN 49.76 20.29 19.3 97.92 0.12* 1            
3. INTDIVER 0.43 0.35 0.03 1.00 -0.33** -0.32** 1           
4. UNREDIV 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.35 -0.35** -0.23** 0.31** 1          
5. SUBSIZEa 7.23 6.62 1.70 123.39 -0.04 -0.08 -0.03 0.04 1         
6. SECTOR (MAN) 0.29 0.45 0.00 1.00 0.06 0.28** -0.16** -0.21** -0.03 1        
7. SECTOR (TER) 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00 -0.09 -0.29** -0.04 0.22** 0.09 -0.50** 1       
8. COUNTRISK 73.69 7.03 57.20 89.50 -0.06 -0.09 0.05 0.16** 0.03 -0.29** 0.29** 1      
9. CORDIST 0.99 0.57 0.04 2.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 -0.16** 0.33** 0.66** 1     
10. EMRGCON 0.53 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.07 0.04 -0.09 -0.12* 0.04 0.24** -0.22** -0.70** -0.64** 1    
11. REGDIST 2.69 1.23 0.70 5.24 -0.04 -0.05 -0.01 0.09 -0.02 -0.24** 0.34** 0.87** 0.82** -0.73** 1   
12. NRMDIST 2.94 1.62 0.58 5.79 -0.05 -0.05 0.01 0.08 -0.04 -0.26** 0.33** 0.81** 0.83** -0.84** 0.90** 1  
13. COGDIST 2.13 0.82 0.27 3.36 -0.05 -0.02 0.09 0.09 -0.06 -0.27** 0.27** 0.72** 0.77** -0.88** 0.79** 0.86** 1 
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Table 2. The regression results  
Notes: 
EQOWN: Equity ownership, CONCEN: The largest shareholder, INTDIVER: International diversification, UNREDIV: Unrelated product diversification, SUBSIZE: The size of the subsidiary, SECTOR (MAN): 
Manufacturing sector, SECTOR (TER): Tertiary sector, COUNTRISK: Country risk, CORDIST: Corruption distance, EMRGCON: Emerging country, REGDIST: Regulative distance, NRMDIST: Normative 
distance, COGDIST: Cognitive distance. 
a Standardized regression coefficients are reported.  
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01. 
N = 355 
 
 
 Dependent variable: Equity ownership (%) 
Variables a   
Main effects  Interactive effects 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6  Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Control variables           
Parent company level           
INTDIVER -0.25** -0.27** -0.26** -0.27** -0.27** -0.27**  -0.26** -0.26** -0.28** 
UNREDIV -0.27** -0.26** -0.28** -0.26** -0.26** -0.26**  -0.28** -0.27** -0.27** 
Subsidiary level           
SUBSIZE  -0.03 -0,03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03  -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
SECTOR (MAN)  -0.07 - 0.05 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07  -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 
SECTOR (TER)  -0.08 -0.06 -0.08 -0.08 -0.09  -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 
Host country level           
COUNTRISK   0.02        
CORDIST   -0.03        
EMRGCON   0.01        
Predictor variable           
CONCEN -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04  -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 
Moderator variables           
REGDIST    -0.01    -0.01   
NRMDIST     -0.03    -0.02  
COGDIST      0.01    0.01 
Interactive effectsb    
REGDIST * CONCEN        -0.15**   
NRMDIST * CONCEN         -0.14**  
COGDIST * CONCEN          -0.09* 
F 24.82** 12.93** 8.24** 11.06** 11.09** 11.05**  11.04** 10.91** 10.11** 
Adjusted R2 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17  0.19 0.18 0.17 
